Directors &amp; Officers - Strategic Leadership or Bondage? by Millhouse, David
Bond University
Research Repository
Directors & Officers - Strategic Leadership or Bondage?
Millhouse, David
Published in:
Enterprise Governance eJournal
Published: 13/08/2020
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Bond University research repository.
Recommended citation(APA):
Millhouse, D. (2020). Directors & Officers - Strategic Leadership or Bondage? Enterprise Governance eJournal,
1(1). https://egej.scholasticahq.com/article/14521-directors-and-officers-strategic-leadership-or-bondage
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
For more information, or if you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact the Bond University research repository
coordinator.
Download date: 11 Sep 2020
Bond University 
Enterprise Governance eJournal 
Editorial Commentary (Non-peer-reviewed) 
2020 
Directors and Officers - Strategic Leadership or Bondage? 
Author 
David Millhouse 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Follow this and additional works at:  https://egej.scholasticahq.com/ 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 
Licence. 
DIRECTORS & OFFICERS ― STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP OR BONDAGE?  
DAVID G MILLHOUSE1 
 
Scholarly empirical analyses provide guidance to policy makers in Australia’s ascent from 
the viral abyss to entrepreneurial sunlit uplands on which post-Covid prosperity might be 
built. These analyses provide regulatory options which can substantially diminish or 
lengthen the damage inflicted by the present crisis. They are policy choices only exercisable 
by the federal government. Damage reduction rests upon releasing the entrepreneurial 
spirits of directors, most of whom control SME’s of various corporate forms. Present 
regulatory policy and the posture adopted by the regulators is achieving the opposite ― 
being responses to demonstrated egregious behaviours of the past. In the present 
environment, this is akin to fighting the last war. Present policy initiatives focus on tax and 
economic policy rather than the removal of the dead-hand of spirit-crushing regulation. 
This paper proposes three options to facilitate entrepreneurship ― to increase business 
capital availability, consistency in definitions, and to address the insurability of directors and 
officers. Each are consistent with Hayne’s law simplification proposals and none re-open 
opportunities for a return to egregious behaviours. 
INTRODUCTION 
‘The law can facilitate economic development and not simply coerce, regulate and 
control’.2 It can also have the opposite result. There is ‘a positive relationship between 
financial sector functions and economic growth’.3 ‘[T]he [S]tate should create the 
framework ― the rules of the game for the economy’.4 These sentiments were echoed by 
Hayne ― [T]here is every chance that adding a new layer of law and regulation would only 
serve to distract attention from the very simple ideas that must inform the conduct of 
financial services entities … Their simplicity points firmly towards a need to simplify the 
existing law … in the blizzard of [statutory] provisions it is too easy to lose sight of those 
simple ideas …5 
It is the directors of companies and of financial services entities who must shoulder the 
heavy burden of carrying Australia from its viral abyss into the sunlit uplands of an 
entrepreneurial economy. Yet most directors are lay persons drawn from the general 
populace ― motivated to lead and employ, but instead subjected to regulatory bondage 
 
1  Adjunct Honorary Senior Research Fellow, Faculty of Law, Bond University, Australia. 
2  Justice Michael Kirby, ‘The company director: past, present, and future’ (Speech, Australian Institute 
of Company Directors, Tasmanian Division, Hobart 1998). 
3  Jeffrey Carmichael and Michael Pomerleano, ‘The development and regulation of Non-Bank Financial 
Institutions’ (Report, World Bank, 2002) 12, citing Ross Levine, Norman Loaya and Thorsten Beck, 
‘Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes’ (World Bank Development Research 
Group, 1999). 
4  Matthew Qvortrup, Angela Merkel Europe’s most influential leader (Duckworth Overlook, 2017) 338. 
5  Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services 
Industry (Interim Report, 2018) (Commissioner Hayne) (‘Hayne Interim’) vol 1 290, quoted in David G 
Millhouse, ‘W[h]ither Australia? Will Parliament Act?’ 14(2) Law and Financial Markets Review (2020) 84 
<https://doi.org/10.1080/17521440.2020.1759218>. 
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and exposed to significant life-changing personal risk. Focussed on virus-induced survival 
rather than the opportunities crises can provide.6 The vast majority of those directors are 
to be found in Australia’s Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) sector and need to 
participate in ‘reinvigorat[ing] the country’s growth and productivity agenda’.7 
How can those earlier sentiments of the law ― being to facilitate commerce in the public 
good, now echoed by Hayne, be achieved? Recent financial press is replete with examples 
of the need for law and regulatory reform.8 But most of the government response targets 
economic and tax policy rather than the regulatory impediments for directors in rebuilding 
the economy. Whilst there has been some deferral of additional compliance costs 
associated with statutory interventions,9 there is no change in regulator posture,10 an 
example of how litigation if successful could choke off credit to consumers and business, 
particularly SME’s where bank finance is contingent on provision of personal security. 
Indeed, and despite scholarly research to the contrary, regulatory policy and its compliance 
implementation is becoming increasingly onerous for directors, imposed as statutory and 
regulatory responses to previous egregious behaviours. Nor is there any obvious 
implementation of the most important of the Hayne recommendations, despite proposals 
from the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC).11 This could provide the circuit 
breaker to the present position, adopting a military metaphor ― fighting the last war. 
Some authors suggest the capital investment required to replace virus induced foregone 
investment be c. AUD104 billion.12 Whatever the actual aggregate investment may need 
to be, it is clear that the Australian economy needs to grow sustainably beyond its historical 
annual performances,13 to provide increased supplies of goods and services and to 
stimulate domestic and international demand for them. Capital investment is but one part 
of that story ― it is the directors of entrepreneurial enterprises that must be the driving 
force. If they are not, then the burden of income support will fall heavily upon 
government.  
There is no one legal reform solution, but there are identifiable themes which can be 
enacted by government in the short run. Two themes are ― reform of private capital 
markets to facilitate investment, and removal of unnecessary director risks. These assist 
the elimination of unnecessary compliance and cost burdens and commence Hayne’s 
 
6  See, eg, Adam Creighton, ‘Hollow rhetoric missed opportunity’, The Australian (Sydney, 13 May 2020). 
7  Philip Lowe, An Economic and Financial Update (Speech, Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney 21 April 
2020). 
8  See, eg, Chris Berg, ‘This silent deregulation should become a new pillar of recovery’, Opinion The 
Australian Financial Review (Sydney, April 27 2020) citing Christian Bjørnskov, ‘Economic freedom and 
economic crises’ 45 European Journal of Political Economy (2016) 11–23; Janet Albrechtsen, ‘Just a word if 
I may, PM: Vorsorgeprinzip’, (Commentary The Australian (Sydney, 18 March 2020). 
9  See, eg, John Kehoe, ‘Banking inquiry laws delayed’, The Australian Financial Review (Sydney 9–10 May 
2020) 3. 
10  See, eg, ASIC v Westpac Banking Corporation [2020] FCAFC 111 (26 June 2020) (Middleton, Gleeson, 
Lee JJ). 
11  Millhouse (n 5) 85 citing Australian Law Reform Commission, The Future of Law Reform: A Suggested 
Program of Work 2020–25 (Report, December 2019) 31–36. 
12  Pradeep Philip and Stephen Smith, ‘A $104bn investment crisis is on the horizon’, The Australian 
(Sydney, June 1 2020). 
13  See, eg, Sinclair Davidson, ‘JobKeeper cannot be for keeps’, The Australian Financial Review (Sydney, 20 
May 2020). 
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proposed simplification of the law. They also provide the basis for longer term systemic 
modernisation of the law so that, once again, it serves the needs of the economy in the 
public interest. None of these proposals permit a return to the egregious behaviours 
identified by Hayne and quantified by this author.14 
RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
Empirical analysis illustrates how best regulatory regimes should respond to crises.15 This 
scholarly research analyses economic freedom and crisis risk (212 crises in 175 countries) 
for the period 1993-2010, concluding that ‘economic freedom is robustly associated with 
smaller peak-trough ratios and shorter recovery times’.16 It also acknowledges that policy 
derived from this empirical analysis is ‘politically contested’,17 as it would be here in 
Australia in efforts to meet the challenges of a changed economy. The primary dichotomy 
is whether regulatory institutions or market forces can best assist a post-crisis economy. 
Paternalism versus entrepreneurship. Australian statutory and regulatory policy has a long 
history of oscillating between the two, continuing today.18 
‘Entrepreneurs are arguably specifically important during the period of recovery of a crisis, as 
firms and jobs have been destroyed … [f]ollowing a crisis, entrepreneurial opportunities are 
likely to increase … [but] public regulations such as licensing requirements and other entry 
barriers can prevent entrepreneurs from realizing new profit opportunities …’19 
From an economy-wide opportunity cost perspective, the research concludes that the 
difference between the two postures is a recovery period of 3 years versus 5 years and a 
diminution of economic activity of less than 10% or more than 20%.20 Applied to post-
Covid Australia, it implies recovery can at best take until 2023 with a much lower 
diminution of economic activity than otherwise. For this to occur, then the spirits of 
individual entrepreneurship must be unleashed. 
There are multiple components of economic freedom, in this analysis statistically 
attributed to ‘regulatory efficiency’21 and ‘licensing regulations … as well as regulatory 
transparency of their enforcement’.22 Ipso facto, removal of barriers to entrepreneurial 
endeavour ‘limit[s] economic and social losses during crises’.23 These are important in 
‘normative’ times, but they assume critical importance in crisis response. Apart from 
 
14  David G Millhouse, ‘Empirical Analysis supports the Hayne long run reform thesis’ 13(2–3) Law and 
Financial Markets Review (2019) 162–187 <https://doi.org/10.1080/17521440.2019.1602923>. 
15  Christian Bjørnskov, ‘Economic freedom and economic crises’ 45 European Journal of Political Economy 
(2016) 11–23. 
16  Ibid 11, 20. 
17  Ibid. 
18  David G Millhouse, ‘From Campbell to Hayne: W[h]ither Australia? Australian financial regulation and 
supervision at a cross-roads’ 13(2) Law and Financial Markets Review (2019) 81–98 
<http://doi.org.10.1080/17521440.2019.1602696>. 
19  Bjørnskov (n 15) 14. 
20  Ibid 19. Crisis sample size = 80. 
21  Ibid 21. 
22  Ibid 22. 
23  Ibid 22. 
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deferral of some compliance measures, flawed as they are, there appears to be little 
recognition of this research. 
REFORM OF PRIVATE CAPITAL MARKETS 
Entrepreneurial endeavour is a function of individual effort and skill, usually in a director 
and officer role throughout the investment chain. Traditionally in Australia, these efforts 
have been structured in a company or trust (Managed Investment Scheme (MIS)) format, 
with interfaces into the superannuation and non-superannuation capital markets. 
Historical discombobulations resulted in Hayne and multiple statutory and regulatory 
responses. Some of these now serve to diminish the ability of the economy to respond to 
its present crisis. However, even without the simplification of the law recommended by 
Hayne,24 there are immediate reform options which could facilitate economic revival and 
which are consistent with Hayne’s longer run reform recommendations. They would allow 
directors to pursue opportunities, provide necessary financial consumer protections, and 
better manage director risks. Reform would also make Australia more internationally 
competitive in attracting outbound Hong Kong capital flows. The financial product 
passporting regime remains incomplete and uncompetitive despite ten years in the 
making,25 and high barriers to entry make it very restrictive for Australian funds managers. 
Managed Investment Schemes  
In broad terms, Australian MIS (Collective Investment Scheme (CIS) in Singapore) are 
either registered or unregistered.26 The Corporations Act treats each typology differently with 
consequential diminished investor protections in unregistered schemes. Unregistered MIS 
are typically smaller, with fewer than 20 scheme members with up to $2.0 million capital 
raised in a 12-month period (similar to unlisted companies), and usually (not always) do 
not require the issuance of a Product Disclosure Statement (PDS). There are significant 
differences for investors in those unregistered MIS which are subject to winding-up 
proceedings. Empirical analysis27 identified 27.77% of 126 MIS appearing in a senior court 
in the study period were unregistered. Unregistered MIS have considerable economic 
importance, particularly in regional agribusiness and property development small capital 
raisings. However, given the limitations of the Corporations Act, investors have not been 
well-served ― law reform is needed. 
 
24  Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services 
Industry (Final Report, 2018) (Commissioner Hayne) (‘Hayne Final’) 494–496. 
25  Originally proposed by Johnson in 2009, legislation for Asian Region Funds Passport (ARFP) and 
Corporate Collective Investment Vehicles (CCIV) incorporates new chs 8A and 8B in the Corporations 
Act 2001 (Cth). Corporations Amendment (Asian Region Funds Passport) Act 2018 (Cth) received Royal 
Assent on 29 June 2019. Treasury Laws Amendment (Corporate Collective Investment Vehicle) Bill 
2018 remains in the legislature. These allow for multi-jurisdictional financial product distribution (New 
Zealand, Hong Kong, South Korea, Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, Japan and Australia have 
participated in consultations). The Passport is based on mutual recognition principles. Related party 
transactions are regulated in the home country. UCITS principles are accorded world’s best practice 
for custody. The legislation provides for the SLE model in both corporate and limited partnership 
forms, with directors’ duties giving priority to investors over shareholders. 
26  Alan Jessup, Managed Investment Schemes (The Federation Press, 2012) 40–43. 
27  Millhouse (n 14). 
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Singapore has balanced small-CIS economic importance with enhanced legal protections. 
The Business Trust Act28 specifically regulates actively managed special purpose investment 
schemes in property development but can be applied to any defined duration actively 
managed asset class investment. Directors and officers have statutory personal fiduciary 
liability to unit holders in its proscriptive formulation. This personal fiduciary liability 
extends to agents of the trustee-manager appointed to perform some of its functions.29 
Singapore business trusts regulation only partly follows the Australian MIS Responsible 
Entities (RE) model (where directors of the Australian corporate trustee owe fiduciary 
duty to it, and a best interest duty to unit holders  which does not necessarily confer direct 
fiduciary liability to them), and is similar to the (unenacted) Australian Single Legal Entity 
(SLE) proposal.30 It also has similarity with Australian superannuation entity trustee 
directors whose fiduciary duty is directly statutorily owed to the beneficiaries31 ‘to [ensure] 
that fiduciary responsibility towards unitholders of a business trust is clearly placed on a 
single entity’, being the trustee-manager.32 This is not the case for Singapore CISs (real 
property or securities), resulting in business trust unit holders having more fiduciary 
protection than those in CISs, which retains the traditional split trustee-manager model. 
In Singapore, the distinction in regulation is whether the trust is an active or managed one. 
This distinction was to facilitate cross-border investment.33 
All Australian MISs should be registered ― unregistered MISs should be abolished. There 
is a market need for small, actively managed collective investment schemes, particularly in 
small-scale property development and agriculture and especially in regional areas. These 
would be regulated using the Singapore business trust or the previously proposed SLE 
models, amending Pt 5C of the Corporations Act. That is, all Australian collective investment 
schemes are de jure registered MISs unless they come under these new active trust 
provisions.  
Ideally, the proscriptive formulations in the Singapore Business Trusts Act could be extended 
to include the prescriptive fiduciary-like duty of care elements found in the German untreue 
principles, now encoded in European statute ― adherence to the spirit of the law as well 
as its specific provisions. This moves Australian law closer to that pure liability model and 
could provide the legal platform for enhanced retail investor protection. For consistency, 
this enhanced legal protection should allow an increase in the amount that can be invested 
and an increase in the number of unit holders34 in these proposed Australian business 
trusts. An alignment with the crowd-sourced funding provisions35 for an annual capital 
raise of $5.0 million from all sources,36 and with reform of s 708(1)(b) of the Corporations 
 
28  Business Trusts Act 2004 (Singapore, Act 30 of 2004) pt III ss 11(1)(a)-(b), (2), (3), (5). 
29  Ibid s 11(5)(a). 
30  Australian Government, Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC), Managed Investment 
Schemes (Report, 2012). See generally David G Millhouse, Corporate Governance in Non-Bank Financial 
Entities (LexisNexisButterworths, 2019) 70–86 [2.119]. 
31  Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 52(8). See also Millhouse (n 30) 70–79 [2.102]. 
32  L S Fern, ‘Real Estate Investment Trusts in Singapore ― Recent Legal and Regulatory Developments 
and the Case for Corporatisation’ (2010) 22 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 36, 57. 
33  Ibid 65. 
34  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 601ED(1), 1012E(2). 
35  Corporations Amendment (Crowd-sourced Funding) Act 2017 (Cth). 
36  Ibid s 738G(2). 
Editorial Commentary (Non peer reviewed) 
(2020) Enterprise Governance eJournal: Centre for Commercial Law, Bond University 6 
Act for company raisings would result in three consistent parallel regimes for small unlisted 
entrepreneurial entities. Further retail investor protection can be provided by extension of 
consumer finance law to these products. The benefit for entrepreneurial directors is a 
closeness to those whom they are there to serve arising from a clear fiduciary relationship, 
a reduction in ‘box-ticking’ compliance obligations, and simpler offer documentation than 
a PDS, most of which are complex and costly to create and administer. 
BROADENING INTERPRETATIONS 
Recent law has enriched the definition of officer, of who is a ‘retail’ investor, and greatly 
increased liability on directors for the issuance of financial products, the latter being a new 
bespoke statutory regime which can greatly reduce investment availability for new and 
existing financial products. 
Definition of Director and Officer 
‘Director’ and ‘Officer’ are defined terms.37 ‘Officer’ has a wider meaning than ‘director’. 
From a liability perspective, it is the practical activities that the officer undertakes, being 
‘the capacity to affect significantly the corporation’s financial standing.’38 ASIC v King does 
not change the statutory definition, but does provide recent unanimous judicial clarity that 
titles are irrelevant ― it is the facts relating to activities and duties which determine officer 
status. Doubtless, the operation of s 9(b)(ii) will be tested in future cases, particularly where 
there are related or associated parties. Complaints of a literal interpretation ‘are 
misplaced’.39 This is particularly important in SME’s40 where there are often counterparties, 
sometimes associated with a director, and with legal rights who may exercise a threat.  
In such a case, that person may fall within either or both of para (b)(i) or (ii) of the definition. 
But that depends on the facts of the case as to the nature and extent of the counterparty’s 
control of, or capacity to control, the corporation’s decision making qua management; it does 
not depend on the counterparty’s legal rights.41 
Importantly, those who influence investment decisions, financial commitments,42 policy 
or decision making43 cannot rely on the professional or business relationship exclusion in 
para (b)(iii). They may find themselves with officer liability, including from conflicts of 
interest arising therefrom and with no business judgment defence.44 
  
 
37  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 9(b)(ii) for each of director and officer. 
38  ASIC v King [2020] HCA 4 [39], [44], [53]. 
39  Ibid [38]. 
40  Ibid [93]. 
41  Ibid [41]. 
42  Ibid [53]. 
43  Ibid [44]. 
44  Millhouse (n 30) 160 [385]. 
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Investor Typology 
Australia has three differing overlays of investor typology continuing its tradition of 
‘obscure and convoluted’ legislation.45 Some parts of the regulatory framework only apply 
if the client is a retail client [or investor].46 This requires holistic reform ― investor typology 
does not always reflect their competencies.47 ‘Professional’,48 ‘sophisticated’,49 ‘wholesale’ 
(being not retail),50 ‘retail’51 overlap. Separately, the Financial Adviser Standards and Ethics 
Authority (FASEA)52 introduced further confusion into the retail/wholesale investor 
typology extending the interpretation of retail investor to include financial 
comprehension53 and applies to ‘relevant providers’54 not only to traditionally termed 
financial advisers.55  A person ‘may be a retail client for some purposes and a wholesale 
client for others.’56 A Self-Managed Super Fund (SMSF) trustee director may be retail, but 
the SMSF is not. Similarly, the interface with the non-FASEA financial advice provisions57 
has bizarre consequences. 
[This] new law applies to some financial services firms who are not fiduciaries with respect to 
the giving of that advice at general law. However, because of the narrow definition of retail 
client, many financial advisers who are fiduciaries …  are not subject to the new law.58  
These examples are all consequences of accretive statutory change. 
Design and distribution of financial products 
The DDO Act59 amends the Corporations Act, National Consumer Credit Protection Act and the 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) Act, its Design and Distribution 
Obligations (DDO) implementation deferred until 5 October 2021. Its product 
 
45  Pamela Hanrahan, ‘Legal Framework for the Provision of Financial Advice and Sale of Financial 
Products to Australian Households’ Royal Commission in the Banking, Superannuation, and Financial Services 
Industry (Background Paper 7) 13 citing International Litigation Partners Pte Ltd v Chameleon Mining NL 
[2011] FCAFC 50 [152]–[153] (Young JA). 
46  Ibid 21 [2.4]. 
47  See, eg, Millhouse (n 30) 194 [4.17]–[4.30]. 
48  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 9 reg 7.6.02AE. 
49  Ibid ss 708(8), 761GA. 
50  Ibid ss 761G(4), 761G(7)(c)(ca), reg 7.128.02AB. 
51  See, eg, Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 738D, 760A(a), 761A, 761G, 761GA, 994A(1), 1012E. 
52  Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Act 2017 (Cth). 
53  David G Millhouse, ‘Best Interest Duties of Financial advisers ― More Law, More Confusion’ (2020) 
Enterprise Governance eJournal, Centre for Commercial Law, Bond University 11. 
54  Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Act 2017 (Cth) s 910A.  
55  A relevant provider can be any person or entity licensed and engaged in transactional personal advice 
to FASEA’s interpretation of retail client. It could include stockbrokers, accountants, mortgage 
brokers, and sales representatives. See especially FASEA, Financial Planners and Advisers Code of Ethics 
(Guidance FG002, 2019) 6. 
56  Hanrahan  (n 45) 22 [2.4].  
57  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961B. 
58  Hanrahan, ‘The relationship between equitable and statutory “best interests” obligations in financial 
services law’ (2013) 46(1) Journal of Equity 7 para [V]. See also, Millhouse (n 30) 234–235 [5.66]. 
59  Treasury Laws Amendment (Design and Distribution Obligations and Product Intervention Powers) Act 2019 (Cth); 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pt 7.8A. 
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intervention powers have been in force since 6 April 2019. Originally proposed by Murray60 
in 2014, its objective is to regulate the sale of financial products to retail consumers of 
those products. It seeks to do so by introducing statutory tests of appropriateness,61 target 
market determinations62, and financial product distribution conduct63 by regulated 
persons64. ASIC may exempt persons or classes of persons.65 Orders may be sought and 
made to redress loss of damage to financial consumers including declarations that a 
contract be void or void ab initio.66 There is some subjectivity ― ‘[i]n considering whether 
a financial product has resulted in, or will or is likely to result in significant detriment to 
retail clients…’67 Civil penalties apply.68 Similar amendments are made to the National 
Consumer Credit Protection (NCCP) Act. 
Financial products include home mortgages, savings accounts, term deposits, prospectus 
and PDS offers of securities, hybrids, derivatives, all financial products regulated by the 
ASIC Act in respect of conscionability and consumer protection, and NCCPA products. 
In short, those products around which modern life exists. It applies to existing financial 
(including MIS) products and to new ones sold to retail investors, each of which will now 
require a ‘target market determination’ by a ‘regulated person’. If ASIC applies its financial 
product intervention powers policies to DDO, then all issuers of financial product offers 
will not have to have breached fundraising law to trigger a DDO intervention and there is 
no ASIC obligation to act confidentially. Murray originally conceived these powers to have 
a limited life span. This now seems unlikely. 
A more useful approach might be reform of the three overlapping typologies of investor 
with ASIC using its exemption powers to limit the types of investor to whom a product 
can be sold, an option considered by Murray.69 There is a distinction in required regulatory 
skills sets between ASIC’s product intervention powers and its DDO powers although 
they were introduced in the same statute, the latter requiring a broader and deeper 
comprehension of financial product markets than statutory compliance alone. 
EXPANSION OF DIRECTOR RISKS 
Directors and Officers Insurance and class actions 
Media reporting consistently reports director and officer risks becoming unaffordable 
even if they are available at all, many insurers reportedly having withdrawn from the 
Australian Directors and Officers (D&O) insurance market. The financial press is replete 
with calls for interventions into the class action industry. As an example, in a succinct op-
 
60  David Murray, Financial System Inquiry Final Report (Australia Treasury, 2014) 198–212 (‘Murray’) recs 21 
and 22. 
61  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Div 2 s 994B(8). 
62  Ibid s 994B. 
63  Ibid ss 994A, 994D, 
64  Ibid. 
65  Ibid s 994L. 
66  Ibid s 994Q. 
67  Ibid s 1023E(1). 
68  Ibid s 1023Q. 
69  Murray (n 60) 210. 
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ed, Albrechtsen70 identifies four reform needs including remediation of the ‘director’s and 
officer’s insurance crisis’. Similar issues exist with the cost of professional indemnity 
insurance for financial advisers with blame being attached to class action litigation.71  
Poor insurability is likely to ‘suffocate entrepreneurial [endeavour] and investment and 
growth-focussed decisions in Australia, as boards become more risk averse’.72 Australian 
directors are potentially exposed to liabilities arising from ‘more than 600 pieces of 
legislation’.73 Important risks for SME’s, including securities claims and special excess 
limits for non-executive directors ‘have been restricted or removed’.74 Marsh says ‘it is not 
just publicly listed companies that are experiencing premium and retention increases and 
reduced capacity, [claiming] [t]he effects of litigation funded class actions have rippled 
through all D&O policies, as well as management liability policies commonly purchased 
by [SMEs]…75 Reliance on a company deed of indemnity may be possible (not always)76 
but its efficacy relies on solvency and liquidity, or the establishment of a trust or reserve 
available to directors and officers as self-insurance.  
Special types of MIS ― litigation financing and Workers Entitlement Funds 
Media reporting can have a negative feedback loop acquiring influential global momentum 
of its own whereas legal scholarship, even when reported, does not. Scholarly empirical 
analysis of class action litigation77 does not support the claims made by Marsh or similar 
claims in the financial press. Questions therefore arise as to the underlying reasons for the 
rise in premium costs and the reductions in cover. Legal scholarship is not replete with 
empirical analysis so in the present debate on D&O costs and availability, sober analysis 
is essential and should be heeded. 
Morabito, based on his data contends ― ‘no balanced or objective assessment of the 
volume of class action litigation in Australia could possibly lead to the conclusion that 
there has been an explosion in the number of class actions filed in Australia.’78 His research 
also shows that ‘after 2018 there has been a decrease in the number of (a) Australian class 
actions; (b) federal class actions; (c) Australian funded class actions; and (d) federal funded 
 
70  Janet Albrechtsen, ‘This lavish lawyers’ picnic must be brought to an end’, Commentary The Australian, 
(Sydney, June 24 2020) 10.  
71  See, eg, Sarah Kendall, ‘Compensation firm slams AMP’s arrogance’, Daily News Investor Daily, (Sydney, 
6 July 2020). 
72  Marsh Pty Ltd, Submission No 14 to Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial 
Services, Inquiry into Litigation Funding and the Regulation of the Class Action Industry (11 June 2020) 6[D]. 
See also Marsh Pty Ltd, Submission to the Australia Law Reform Commission, Inquiry into Class Action 
Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders ‘Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance’ (27 July 2018). 
73  Ibid 4[B]. 
74  Ibid 3 [B]. 
75  Ibid 3 [A]. 
76  See, eg, Millhouse (n 30) 71 [2.85]. 
77  Vince Morabito, ‘An Evidence-Based Approach to Class Action Reform in Australia ― Shareholder 
Class Actions in Australia―Myths v Facts’ (Research Paper, Department of Business Law and 
Taxation Monash Business School, November 2019) 9 <ssrn.com/abstract3484660>. 
78  Vince Morabito, Submission No 6 to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services, Inquiry into Litigation Funding and Regulation of the Class Action Industry, (10 June 2020) 
4. 
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class actions.’79 It is shareholder class actions that seem to be the subject of financial press 
and insurer attention, including claims that shareholder class action litigation was not 
originally proposed to be an outcome of Pt IVA.80 In the four class action jurisdictions 
analysed,81 there have been 634 class actions over Morabito’s study period of 27 years and 
4 months. These concerned 420 disputes.82 Of these, 122 were shareholder cases involving 
63 companies or groups,83 only 9 of which were in financial services and products. He also 
reports a declining trend in shareholder class actions declining from 44.7% of all actions 
in 2016–17 to 32.2% in 2019-20.84 Of the 122, 67% were brought against the companies 
only, not the directors. In only 4.9% of the cases, the actions were brought against the 
directors alone.85 The proportion of cases joining directors in the action have declined 
from 18.8% of the total sample to 10% of cases filed in the 2018–19 financial year.86  
Morabito’s data leads to the conclusion that there needs to be a more thorough 
government review of the D&O insurance sector, perhaps by the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission (ACCC) or Productivity Commission into the underlying 
issues contributing to both insurance availability and cost. A review may determine 
whether this historical data is an accurate predictor of future trends. Morabito’s data 
covers shareholder actions, not investor actions which would capture MIS. This is an 
artificial dichotomy and both sectors should be included in the proposed review. 
Legal analysis demonstrates the very broad application in private law of class actions87 in 
seeking redress to imbalances of power. These are not only shareholder or investor 
originated actions.88 Since inception to 2016, of the 329 Pt IVA proceedings in the Federal 
Court, only 89 were on behalf of investors.89 From a director perspective, every 
organisation needs a potential class action risk analysis.  
Historically, since the introduction of the class action provisions in March 1992,90 third 
party litigation funders did not require an Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL) 
but were and are subject to general law interventions and court oversight.91 ‘In July 2013, 
litigation funders were specifically exempted … from the requirement to hold an 
[AFSL]…’92 Their exemptions extended to Pt 5C of the Corporations Act and the National 
Consumer Credit Code.93 These exemptions have been supported by scholarly opinion if there 
 
79  Ibid. 
80  Morabito (n 77) 9. 
81  Federal Court, Victoria, NSW, and Queensland Supreme Courts. 
82  Morabito (n 77) 12–13 tab 1. 
83  Ibid 15–16 tab 2 
84  Ibid 16. 
85  Ibid 19. 
86  Ibid. 
87  Vince Morabito and Jarrah Ekstein, ‘Class Actions Filed for the Benefit of Vulnerable Persons ― An 
Australian Study’ (2016) 35 (1) Civil Justice Quarterly 61. 
88  Morabito (n 78) 3. 
89  Morabito (n 87) 87. 
90  Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt IVA. 
91  Ibid. 
92  Corporations Amendment Regulation 2010 (No 6) cited in Australian Law Reform Commission, Integrity, 
Fairness and Efficiency―An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (Report 134, 
December 2018) 62 (‘ALRC 2018’). 
93  Ibid. 
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is a net benefit argument,94 by the ALRC (initially)95 and by ASIC.96 Scholarly opinion 
however does acknowledge that ‘attention instead be placed on giving courts presiding 
over this type of litigation adequate powers to ensure class members are treated fairly and 
receive adequate compensation in successful class actions.97 Of itself, this justifies the 
application of Parts 5 and 7 to these types of  MIS and access to the considerable 
jurisprudence available since the advent of the Managed Investments Act in 1998. This reform 
of itself does not restrict the access of claimants to the courts in redress of grievances. 
Indeed, it may reduce costs over those of a bespoke statutory regime, being a new body 
of law. It may also allow more transparency to counterparty directors. 
As is often the case in Australia, definitional boundaries became contentious. ‘All that the 
word “scheme” requires is that there be some programme, or plan of action’.98 It is not a 
defined term, but there are constituent statutory elements. Judicial analysis concluded a 
litigation funding scheme was indeed a MIS,99 satisfying these five essential elements in s 
9 of the Corporations Act. 
This previous and now reformed exemption100 from the financial advice and managed 
investment scheme provisions of the Corporations Act101 for litigation financing and 
contingency fee charging were an example of Hayne’s ‘special rules, exceptions and carve-
outs’,102 there being considerable but unsuccessful support for ‘a bespoke licensing regime 
that sat outside the [AFSL] regime but imposing comparable obligations’.103 Some 
participants support AFSL and MIS reform to include class action financiers.104 Others, 
perhaps conflicted, do not.105 
Another example is the continuing exemption of Workers Entitlement Funds (WEF) 
afforded by ASIC. WEFs are established, normally as joint ventures, to provide for 
 
94  Morabito (n 78) 1. 
95  ALRC 2018 (n 80) 161 [6.37]. 
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[1981] HCA 49 [11] Mason J. See Millhouse (n 30) [3.117], [3.133]. 
99  Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v International Litigation Funding Partners Pte Ltd [2009] FCAFC 147 (Sundberg, 
Dowsett, and Jacobson JJ). 
100  Proposed to take effect on the 22 August 2020. 
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102  Hayne Final (n 24) 16, 495 rec 7.3. 
103  ALRC 2018 (n 92) [6.17]–[6.42]. 
104  See, eg, Norton Rose Fulbright, Submission to Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services, Inquiry into Litigation Funding and the Regulation of the Class Action Industry (June 2020) 2 
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2020) <www.kwm.com/en/au/knowledge/insights/litigation-funding>. 
105  See, eg, Woodsford Litigation Funding, Submission No 16 to Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services, Inquiry into Litigation Funding and the Regulation of the Class Action 
Industry (11 June 2020) 18; Omni Bridgeway, Submission to Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
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employee entitlements, particularly in the construction industry. WEFs are MIS’s but are 
exempted from Pt 5C of the Corporations Act.106  
Both types of funds facilitate essentially private law actions in protection of the vulnerable 
from asymmetries of power ― which have a long history in Australia.107 But their 
implementation has been open to abuse,108 with 2017 statutory reform of WEF’s 
remaining before Parliament,109 better enabling public enforcement. Proposed reforms 
include registration,110 employee choice,111 expenditure policies,112 authorised use of 
contributions,113 and disclosable arrangements114 to reform the egregious deficiencies 
identified by Heydon. 
CONCLUSION ― WHAT CAN DIRECTORS DO? 
For short run survival, directors can display prudence in capital, skills and customer 
preservation using where possible the various Federal and State fiscal interventions and 
compliance deferrals. The more important picture is for the survivors in the Covid after-
life. Bjørnskov’s observations115 are likely to be replicated in Australia and provide new 
entrepreneurial opportunities ― but only if the impediments to entrepreneurship are 
removed or diminished. 
What is required, in addition to the specific options in this paper is fulfillment of the Hayne 
promise ― simplification of the law.  It also requires a change in posture of the regulatory 
agencies to enable entrepreneurs to fight this new war, not just deliver reparations for the 
wrongs of the past. Why not litigate? is an easy-to-use metaphor arising directly from 
previous egregious behaviours by some, but with unintended consequences in fighting this 
new war.  It requires a change of regulatory posture to a Responsive Regulation116 
approach ― consultative, educational, aligning of regulatory interests with those of a 
dynamic economy in the public good. The economic and military security of the nation 
will depend on it. (Re)building supply chains for civil and military consumption, rebuilding 
employment in capital and regional areas all requires access to capital by entity directors, 
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most of which are in the SME sector. It requires consistency and certainty in the law. It 
requires reduction in personal and family risks associated with those director 
responsibilities. Presently the risks are extremely onerous and can ruinously affect family 
security. 
For Australia to escape its viral abyss and drive to the sunlit uplands depends on such 
reforms. They are unlikely without sustained lobbying at the micro-level. Most reform 
discussion is of tax and economic policy conducted mostly by representatives of large 
organisations with their own sectoral interests in fora remote from the needs of SME’s. 
Micro-level means direct contacts with members of parliament in both houses and a 
considerable widening of industry association lobbying to them. This paper and others117 
can be a basis for those approaches. 
 
 
 
117  See, eg, Millhouse (n 5). 
